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Abstract 
The Finance Act of 1925 imposed upon rayon yarn an excise duty of 1s. per lb. and an import duty 
of 2s. per lb. This article argues that the difference between the excise and import duties was not 
intended as classic protection. Rather, the difference was intended only to indemnify British 
producers for the excise-wrought decline in domestic consumption by means of an offsetting 
reduction of imports. This article then estimates that, had the rayon duties been removed in 1926, 
the share of imports in Britain’s growing consumption of rayon yarn would have increased from 
one-tenth to at least one-quarter. Trade policy had secured the domestic market for British rayon 
firms prior to the formation of an international cartel in 1927. More broadly, this article instantiates 
that trade policy was considerably distorting the British market for manufactured goods well before 
the landmark Import Duties Act of 1932. 
 
Introduction 
Rayon, one of the classic industries of the Second Industrial Revolution, rose to a position of 
economic prominence in Britain in the 1920s. Despite the phenomenal growth of the British rayon 
industry during this decade, there were unmistakable signs of vulnerability in the industry, 
particularly during the early 1920s.1 From 1922-5, Britain was a net importer of rayon yarn (Trade 
of the United Kingdom). By the middle of the decade, imports amounted to more than one-third of 
domestic consumption of rayon yarn (calculated from Harrop, 1968, p. 82; Trade of the United 
                                                        
1 Britain’s output of rayon yarn increased eightfold from 1920-9 (Harrop, 1968, p. 82). 
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 Kingdom). Britain’s longstanding specialization in textile production hardly ensured a leading 
position in the emerging (artificial) textile industry of rayon. 
 Rayon was unique insofar as it numbered among a small selection of British manufacturing 
industries receiving ‘protection’—the applicability of this term to the rayon industry is addressed 
shortly—prior to the Import Duties Act of 1932.2 The Customs Duties Act of 1915, the 
Safeguarding of Industries Acts of 1921 and 1925, and the annual Finance Acts of the late 1920s 
extended protection to various industries, to the extent that 9 percent of British manufacturing 
occurred in a protected industry by 1930 (Varian, 2019). Among the pre-1932 protected industries, 
the largest was motorcars. The effect of protection on this industry has been assessed by Foreman-
Peck (1979), who estimated that the McKenna duty on motorcars raised domestic production by 
at least 40 percent. This article considers the second largest of the pre-1932 protected industries, 
the rayon industry.3 (For the purposes of this article, the rayon industry should be taken as 
synonymous with the rayon yarn industry.4) 
 The Finance Act of 1925 imposed an excise duty of 1s. per lb. on domestically produced 
rayon yarn and an import duty of 2s. per lb. on imported rayon yarn, thereby affording the domestic 
rayon yarn industry a margin of protection of 1s. per lb. (Finance Act, 1925). This article considers 
both the intent and the effect of Britain’s import duty on rayon, which has gone largely unexamined 
in previous literature. Specifically, the article poses two questions. First, why did the rayon duties 
                                                        
2 Lloyd George referred to manufacturing protection in the 1920s as a ‘kind of kangaroo protection, 
jumping from here and there, making little advances here and there’ (quoted in Hicks, 1938, p. 241). 
 3 According to net output in 1930, the largest of the pre-1932 protected manufacturing industries 
was motorcars and motor cycles (£53.5 million), followed by silk and rayon (£9.2 million) and musical 
instruments (£6.0 million) (Varian, 2019, p. 706). 
4 As for the production of cloth, rayon yarn was oftentimes interwoven with cotton yarn to produce 
a mixed cloth. This practice was especially widespread in the 1920s (Harrop, 1979, p. 282). As late as 1930, 
Britain’s output of piece goods of rayon mixed with other materials exceeded its output of piece goods 
wholly of rayon (Fourth Census of Production, 1930: Part 1, 1933).  
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 involve a margin of protection for domestic industry? Second, to what extent did the domestic 
share of the British rayon market depend upon the margin of protection after 1925? 
 Any analysis of the British rayon industry in the 1920s is necessarily complicated by the 
domestic and international market structure of the industry. Until 1925, the British rayon industry 
effectively consisted of two firms: Courtaulds and British Celanese.5 Courtaulds, which produced 
viscose rayon yarn, accounted for 78 percent of domestic production in 1924 (calculated from 
Coleman, 1969, p. 274). Courtaulds’ main domestic competitor in the early 1920s was British 
Celanese, which produced acetate rayon yarn, a more expensive (but close) substitute for viscose 
yarn.6 Internationally, the rayon industry of the 1920s was increasingly characterized by cartels 
and foreign direct investment, which have been examined in recent work by Cerretano. A 
watershed moment in the cartelization of the international rayon industry came in 1927 when 
Courtaulds and the German rayon firm, Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken (VGF), together acquired 
a controlling stake in the Italian rayon firm, Snia Viscosa, which possessed a distinct cost 
advantage owing to the lower wages in Italy (Cerretano, 2012, p. 615). In assessing the tariff 
dependence of the British rayon industry after 1925, proper attention must be given to such 
international commercial arrangements. 
 Further complicating the analysis in this article are deficiencies in the data, arising partly 
from the newness of the rayon industry in the 1920s.7 Britain’s economic statistics often included 
                                                        
5 There was a third firm, Brysilka, which was established in 1920 and produced a fine rayon yarn 
using the cupra-ammonium process. However, compared to Courtaulds and British Celanese, production 
occurred on a very small scale. In 1929, Brysilka had a nominal capitalization of £0.4 million, whereas 
Courtaulds and British Celanese had nominal capitalizations of £20 million and £6 million, respectively. 
Avram (1929, pp. 68-77). 
 6 By means of bold advertisements, British Celanese attempted quite successfully to differentiate 
its acetate rayon yarn from the viscose rayon yarn produced by Courtaulds (Harrop, 1979, p. 289). 
 7 Another deficiency in the data arises from the inaccessibility of the historical records of 
Courtaulds, which Coleman relied upon when writing his magisterial three-volume history of the firm. 
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 rayon, then referred to as ‘artificial silk’, within the silk industry. The Annual Statements of the 
Trade of the United Kingdom report import and export data for rayon at an annual frequency 
throughout the decade, but the Board of Trade’s monthly statistics combine rayon and natural-
fiber silk commodities until the late 1920s. The lack of high-frequency output and trade data 
precludes econometric approaches to estimating the extent to which the British share of the 
domestic rayon market depended upon protection after 1925. Rather, in this article, the extent of 
dependence is ascertained within a two-variety (domestic and imported) Armington framework in 
which the assumed elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic varieties of rayon 
yarn is informed by literature in economic history and economics.  
 The next section of this article surveys several of the most notable historical studies of the 
protection of textile industries. All of these studies relate to the cotton textile industry, consistent 
with the emphasis placed upon this industry in the historical literature on textile protection. Indeed, 
one of the contributions of this article is to widen the scope of the literature to include textile 
industries other than cotton. The following section covers the domestic and international market 
structure of the industry, drawing upon both older research and more recent research by Cerretano. 
The following section investigates whether the import duty on rayon yarn imposed by the Finance 
Act of 1925 was intended as protection. In this section, new archival evidence is brought to the 
fore. The penultimate section presents counterfactual scenarios in which the excise and import 
duties on rayon yarn were removed in 1926. Inspired by Keynes’s argument that sterling was 
overvalued by 10 percent when Britain returned to the gold standard at the pre-war parity, this 
section presents further counterfactual scenarios in which sterling was devalued by 10 percent, 
both with and without the removal of the excise and import duties. The final section offers 
                                                        
Presently, the historical records of Courtaulds are held by AKZO Nobel, and access by scholars is 
prohibited. 
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 concluding remarks regarding this pre-1930s episode of trade policy distorting the British market 
for manufactured goods.  
 
The historical protection of textiles 
Textiles have long been the object of economic policy, including trade policy, as should be 
expected given the unrivalled importance of textiles in the early stages of industrialization in many 
countries (Hoffman, 1958, pp. 111-5). Even despite the emergence of newer industries in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, textiles continued to account for an immense, albeit declining, 
share of world manufacturing output and trade. As late as 1929, textiles accounted for roughly 
one-quarter of world manufactured exports (Tyszynski, 1951, p. 283). History is replete with 
examples of the imposition (or increase) and the removal (or reduction) of tariffs upon textiles. 
This section surveys three well-studied episodes of trade policy toward textiles and then relates 
these episodes to the case of Britain’s protection of rayon in the 1920s. 
 As Britain dismantled its tariffs on manufactured imports in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, it is necessary to look far back in British history to locate an episode of textile protection 
preceding the rayon duties of 1925.8 In the eighteenth century, the British cotton textile industry 
received the most extreme form of protection under the Calico Acts of 1701 and 1722, which 
banned the importation of printed calicos (1701) and, subsequently, all calicos (1722), which came 
mostly from India. Broadberry and Gupta (2009, pp. 293-5) argued that the British cotton textile 
industry, with its much higher wages and raw cotton costs than in the Indian cotton textile industry, 
was dependent upon the import prohibition until its repeal in 1774.9 Moreover, they claimed that 
                                                        
 8 Even before the tariffs on textiles were removed, the tariffs were greatly reduced in the 1820s 
(Imlah, 1958, p. 119, fn. 6). 
 9 In 1770, the British wage and raw cotton price were, respectively, 460% and 320% of the Indian. 
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 the opening of the British market to imports accelerated a process of labor-saving innovation in 
the high-wage British cotton textile industry during the closing decades of the eighteenth century 
(Broadberry & Gupta, 2009, p. 298). Ultimately, by the 1820s, productivity in the British cotton 
industry had increased to a level that more than offset India’s cost advantage of extremely lower 
wages, thereby permitting the British industry to reclaim the domestic market (Broadberry & 
Gupta, 2009, p. 295). 
 The French cotton textile industry underwent a similar transition following the removal of 
its prohibition on cotton textile imports under the Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860, 
known less formally as the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty.10 The prohibition was succeeded by modest 
duties on cotton yarn and cloth. According to Dunham’s study of the French cotton industry, the 
lifting of the import prohibition and the ensuing competition from Britain were instrumental in 
bringing about the modernization of the French industry, including the use of improved spinning 
machines and, to a great extent, the replacement of handlooms by power looms (Dunham, 1928, 
p. 304). Though France already had a cost advantage vis-à-vis Britain in wages, its cotton industry 
had lagged behind Britain’s technologically. However, the liberalization of trade under the 
Cobden-Chevalier Treaty assisted the French industry in narrowing the technological gap and 
maintaining a firm hold of the French market. 
 The question of whether the early nineteenth-century American cotton textile industry, 
specifically cloth production, depended upon protection has also attracted the attention of 
historians. Bils (1984) argued that, in 1833, the American cotton textile industry was heavily tariff-
dependent. Since the factor proportion of labor increased with the thread-count of the cloth, the 
United States, where wages were higher than in Britain, possessed a competitive advantage (in the 
                                                        
10 Although, the prohibition of certain grades of cotton yarn was lifted in 1836 (Ashley, 1920, p. 
285). 
  7 
 
 domestic, American market) in lower thread-count cotton cloth. Above a threshold thread-count, 
the competitive advantage shifted to Britain, where wages were lower than in the United States.11 
However, the tariff functioned to raise the threshold thread-count beneath which American firms 
were competitive, thereby allowing domestic production to displace imports in the intermediate 
range of thread-counts. Bils (1984, p. 1043) estimated that, had the import duty on cotton cloth 
been removed, value-added in the American cotton textile industry would have contracted by at 
least one-half. Harley (1992) claimed that the antebellum American cotton industry relied entirely 
upon the tariff for its survival.12 Focusing on the most plain, low thread-count cloth, he found that 
the American price exceeded the pre-tariff British price (plus shipping) through the 1850s (Harley, 
1992, p. 568). 
 What insights might these episodes of textile protection offer for a study of Britain’s 
protection of the rayon industry in the 1920s? First, there is a close relationship between protection 
and productivity, with the elimination or reduction of protection typically spurring technological 
improvements in domestic industry so that it can better compete against imports. Conversely, the 
imposition or increase of protection could retard productivity growth. It might be reasoned that 
Britain’s protection of its rayon industry hindered its long-term productivity growth and, 
consequently, its ability to compete against imports.13 However, the potential effect of the Finance 
Act of 1925 on the productivity of the British rayon industry extends beyond the scope of the 
present article, which focuses on the tariff dependence of the British rayon market in the years 
                                                        
 11 It might be questioned why lower-wage Britain did not also possess a competitive advantage in 
the American market for lower thread-count cotton cloth. However, it should be noted that the United States 
possessed a cost advantage in raw cotton, which accounted for a higher proportion of the factor content of 
lower thread-count cotton cloth. 
 12 This article provoked debate. See Irwin and Temin (2001) and Harley (2001). 
 13 For those manufacturing industries that received protection prior to 1932, Broadberry and Crafts 
(2011, p. 272) found a statistically significant decline in the growth rate of labor productivity between 1924-
35 and 1935-48. 
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 immediately following the Act, although it may incidentally be noted that there was a marked 
decline from 1925-9 in Courtaulds’ labor productivity in rayon yarn (Coleman, 1969, p. 429).14 
 The second, more salient insight for the analysis in this article is that protection, taking the 
form of either an import prohibition or a tariff, has often been used to counteract a foreign cost 
advantage of lower wages. Surely, this is one of the most recurring themes in the history of 
international trade in textiles. In the eighteenth century, the British cotton textile industry depended 
upon protection against imports from lower-wage India. In the early nineteenth century, the 
American cotton textile industry depended, to at least a considerable extent, upon protection 
against imports from lower-wage Britain. Analogously, in the early 1920s, the British rayon 
industry contended with rising imports from lower-wage Italy, which, as this article addresses, 
may have been abated through the trade policy adopted in 1925. 
 
The British and international market for rayon in the 1920s 
In one of the earliest economic studies of the British rayon industry, Jones (1941, p. 95) referred 
to the British market for viscose rayon yarn in the 1920s as ‘quasi-monopolistic’.15 The 
monopolistic character of the market obviously derives from the dominant share held by 
Courtaulds. Yet, in describing the market, the greater emphasis ought to be placed upon the ‘quasi’. 
Indeed, the British market for rayon yarn was never an unfettered monopoly. This section identifies 
those three economic forces that acted to maintain a competitive domestic price.  
                                                        
 14 From 1925-9, the output of rayon yarn per worker at Courtaulds declined from 2,200 to 1,800 
lbs. p.a. 
15 Also see Harrop (1979, p. 284). 
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  First, Courtaulds faced domestic competition from British Celanese, which was formed as 
a public company in 1920.16 Although British Celanese produced a technically different 
commodity, acetate rayon yarn, it was nevertheless a reasonably close substitute for viscose rayon 
yarn.17 In price, acetate yarn commanded a modest premium of 21 percent over viscose yarn in 
1926, the earliest year for which the price of acetate yarn is known (calculated from Economist, 
11 November 1933). It might be argued that the prospect of consumer substitution from viscose to 
acetate imposed a ceiling upon the price that Courtaulds could command for viscose. When 
Courtaulds began to produce acetate rayon yarn on a small scale in 1926—acetate never amounted 
to more than a tiny fraction of Courtaulds’ yarn output—Samuel Courtauld, the firm’s Chairman, 
explained the decision: ‘We were, however, faced with the fact that if we did not produce acetate 
yarn we might have to reduce viscose prices considerably in order to retain the custom of those to 
whom acetate would be preferable unless viscose gave a very substantial price advantage’ (quoted 
in Coleman, 1969, p. 270). 
 Second, the British market was supplied by imports that were admitted free of duty until 
1925. Figure 1 illustrates the quantity of rayon yarn imports and the share of rayon yarn imports 
in domestic consumption. Domestic consumption is calculated as domestic production plus 
imports and minus exports.18 Italy accounted for most of the growth in rayon yarn imports, the 
                                                        
 16 British Celanese originated as the British Cellulose and Chemical Manufacturing Co. during the 
First World War. Investment in the company by the Ministry of Munitions was rolled over into a relatively 
small equity stake in the reconstructed public company in 1920. The Treasury transferred this £500,000 
equity stake to the Securities Trust, which was administered by the Bank of England. Cerretano (2009, p. 
93).  
17 Compared to viscose, acetate has a higher wet tensile strength and superior draping qualities 
(Silverman, 1946, p. 319). 
 18 A portion of Britain’s output of rayon yarn was, in fact, exported. The simultaneous existence of 
imports and exports is partly explained by the destination of the exports, with the British Empire taking the 
majority of Courtaulds’ rayon yarn exports in 1924 (Coleman, 1969, p. 276). The British Empire was 
marked by well-developed commercial networks. Moreover, since the Edwardian era, the Dominions had 
applied preferential tariffs to British-made imports (Russell, 1947, p. 17). 
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 quantity of bilateral imports having risen from 0.2 million lbs. (9 percent of imports) in 1922 to 
5.1 million lbs. (45 percent) in 1925 (calculated from Trade of the United Kingdom). Sizable 
quantities were also imported from the Netherlands and Switzerland. Table 1 reports the volumes 
of Britain’s bilateral imports. 
 
Figure 1. Share of imports in Britain’s consumption of rayon yarn, 1920-30 (Sources: Import share of 
domestic consumption: calculated from Harrop (1968, p. 82) and Trade of the United Kingdom; 
Imports: Trade of the United Kingdom.) 
 
 Third, natural-fiber yarns, mainly cotton and silk, represented additional substitutes for 
rayon yarn in the 1920s. As Jones (1941, p. 83) observed, with the declining price of rayon, there 
was an increasing substitution from cotton to this slightly more expensive, artificial yarn, which 
so effectively and appealingly imitated the luster of real silk. From 1922-5, the price ratio of lower-
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 Harrop, 1979, p. 285). This rapid fall in the relative price of rayon yarn provoked disagreement 
among policymakers when the rayon duties were being debated in 1925. Some regarded artificial 
silk as a variant of silk and, thus, a luxury good that could be taxed without injuring the average 
consumer (United Kingdom House of Commons, 10 June 1925). Others regarded artificial silk as 
a slightly more expensive substitute for cotton, within the reach of the working class (United 
Kingdom House of Commons, 10 June 1925).19 Although the former opinion won out in 
Parliament, the economic reality was that rayon increasingly competed against cotton.20 The 
availability of high-quality cotton yarn, including mercerized yarn, militated against the emergence 
of a monopoly market for British rayon yarn (United Kingdom House of Commons, 10 June 1925). 
Table 1. 
Britain’s bilateral imports of rayon yarn, 1922-9 (million lbs.) 
Year Italy Netherlands Switzerland Other Total 
1922 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.0 2.6 
1923 2.5 0.5 2.1 0.8 5.9 
1924 4.5 1.3 2.7 1.8 10.3 
1925 5.1 1.6 2.2 2.9 11.8 
1926 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.4 2.3 
1927 0.8 0.5 0.3 1.1 2.7 
1928 0.9 0.4 0.2 1.4 2.9 
1929 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.4 2.1 
Source: Trade of the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                        
 19 On this point, Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, MP stated: 
 
I took the trouble to make inquiries in my own constituency, and I found there it was a very 
common thing for the factory girls to purchase artificial silk for the purpose of knitting 
themselves jumpers, in order to look neat and tidy when they went out, and for that purpose 
they purchased about a pound of artificial silk, and were able to make these up for 
themselves at anything from 8s. to 12s. or 13s. Surely, taking into account all the 
multitudinous things which the poorer people make out of silk, whether natural or artificial, 
the idea that silk is a luxury which is only used by the well-to-do is finally exploded. 
 
 20 In his study of the international silk industry, Federico (1997, p. 43) claimed that rayon was not 
a substitute for silk, but rather for cotton. 
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  It must recognized that, even by the end of the 1920s, the domestic market for rayon yarn 
remained rather minor compared to the markets for most natural-fiber yarns, especially cotton, 
against which rayon closely competed. Table 2 presents Britain’s production and consumption of 
the different textile fiber yarns in the census years 1924 and 1930. In this context, the consumers 
of yarn, an intermediate good, are those British firms engaged in weaving cloth, i.e. not the ultimate 
consumers.21 Nonetheless, the table unambiguously supports the assertion that Lancashire still 
reigned supreme in the production and consumption of yarn in Britain. 
Table 2. 
Britain’s production and consumption of textile yarns, 1924 and 1930 (million lbs.) 
 Production Consumption 
 1924 1930 1924 1930 
Cotton 1,395 1,047 1,240 922 
Woollen and worsted 526 363 492 344 
Linen 97 75 105 80 
Natural silk 2 1 2 1 
Artificial silk (rayon) 22 50 26 45 
Consumption is calculated as production plus imports and minus exports. 
Source: Fourth Census of Production, 1930: Part 1 (1933). 
 
 Internationally, the market for rayon was coming further under the influence of cartels and 
foreign direct investment in the 1920s. Even before the First World War, Courtaulds had 
established a subsidiary corporation, the American Viscose Company, in the United States in 
1910.22 After the First World War, Courtaulds began forging links with the Continental rayon 
industry. In 1925, Courtaulds agreed to a joint venture with VGF to form Glanzstoff-Courtaulds, 
for the purpose of establishing operations in Cologne (Coleman, 1969, p. 278). Moreover, this 
                                                        
 21 British cloth can be exported, just as foreign cloth can be imported. Hence, Britain’s consumption 
of yarn should not be equated to the consumption of yarn by the ultimate consumer, the latter being 
determined by the export and import of cloth. Moreover, the existence of (traded) mixed cloth incorporating 
different fiber yarns greatly impedes any estimation of Britain’s consumption of yarn by the ultimate 
consumer.  
 22 One of the main reasons for Courtaulds’ creation of the subsidiary was to situate production 
behind the high American tariff wall (Coleman, 1969, pp. 104-8). 
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 agreement occasioned a division of national markets, whereby yarn produced by Glanzstoff-
Courtaulds or VGF could only be sold in Britain through Courtaulds (Coleman, 1969, p. 279). 
 Courtaulds and VGF heightened their cooperation when, in 1927, these firms together 
acquired a controlling stake in the mammoth Italian rayon manufacturer, Snia Viscosa (Coleman, 
1969, p. 281). As Cerretano (2004, p. 256) has argued, Snia Viscosa’s rapid growth in the early 
1920s was enabled by Italy’s inflationary monetary policy. However, as Cerretano (2018, p. 553) 
has also argued, Snia Viscosa, faced with rising interest rates and deteriorating access to credit 
beginning in 1925, resorted to raising capital through the sale of equity to Courtaulds and VGF in 
1927. Of course, Courtaulds’ (and VGF’s) investment in Snia Viscosa was not made on benevolent 
grounds. Courtaulds sought control of Snia Viscosa because rayon yarn exports from low-wage 
Italy were undermining the competitiveness of Courtaulds in its markets, which included the 
United States by virtue of its subsidiary American Viscose Company (Cerretano, 2018, p. 554). 
Still, there remains the question: was the competitiveness of Courtaulds in the domestic British 
market challenged by Snia Viscosa in 1926?23 Or had tariffs effectively sheltered the British rayon 
industry against imports? Before answering these questions, the origins of Britain’s rayon duties 
are considered. 
 
The Finance Act of 1925 and the rayon duties 
The return of a Conservative government in October 1924 and a planned increase in fiscal 
expenditure, mainly to fund an expansion of the state pension system, gave impetus to the silk and 
                                                        
 23 Cerretano (2012, p. 615) stated, ‘The implication was that Snia Viscosa could invade the home 
market of Courtaulds at any time, while the latter could not reciprocate the threat, hence the intrinsic 
instability of the agreements [between Courtaulds and VGF] and Courtaulds’ decision to buy a large stake 
in the Italian firm’. However, it is unclear whether ‘home market’ refers to Britain, the United States, or 
both. If ‘home market’ refers to Britain, then this article serves as an evaluation of Cerretano’s statement. 
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 rayon duties (McGuire, 1939, pp. 238-9). Fiscal orthodoxy was the prevailing doctrine of the day. 
In an attempt to avoid a shortfall in the budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston 
Churchill, vigorously supported import duties on natural and artificial silk.  
 In the 1920s, Britain’s natural silk industry was in a dire condition. By 1924, the real output 
of silk manufactures had fallen to the level of the 1820s (Hoffman, 1955, table 54). While most of 
Britain’s consumption of silk manufactures was satisfied through imports, a domestic silk industry 
had limped along since the nineteenth century in Macclesfield and some nearby mill towns. 
Courtaulds itself continued a vestigial production of silk manufactures in Essex (Coleman, 1969, 
p. 249). In 1925, proposed (and later enacted) import duties on raw silk and silk yarn threatened 
to raise the production costs of silk spinners and silk weavers, respectively. An import duty on silk 
cloth, also enacted in 1925, had the potential to offset the higher material-input prices confronting 
the British silk-weaving industry as it competed against imports.24 Yet, the British silk industry 
also competed, at least somewhat, against the British rayon industry. Thus, it was necessary that 
the duties on silk be accompanied by duties on rayon, ‘to avoid handicapping the silk industry in 
the competition with its powerful rival’, according to a February 1925 draft proposal for duties on 
silk and artificial silk prepared by the Board of Customs and Excise (National Archives, CUST 
143/100, p. 147). 
 While initial proposals for duties on rayon yarn included equal import and excise duties, 
the Finance Act of 1925 ultimately included a higher import duty (2s. per lb.) than excise duty (1s. 
per lb.). Was the higher import duty intended as a form of protection, as might be assumed? The 
intention behind the higher import duty can be discerned from the records of the Board of Customs 
                                                        
 24 By the early 1920s, the British silk-weaving industry was so diminished that, in 1924, the import 
share of Britain’s consumption was 95% for ‘piece goods, wholly of silk’ and 79% for ‘piece goods of silk 
mixed with other materials, if known as silks’ (Fourth Census of Production, 1930: Part 1, 1933). 
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 and Excise. Draft proposals for duties on rayon began to include a higher import than excise duty 
only after a letter dated 16 March 1925 from the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, Sir 
Stanley Chapmen, to the Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise, Sir Horace Hamilton. An 
excerpt from the letter is as follows: 
…the British industry would be heavily hit and might be seriously damaged if (in the 
calculation of equivalents) the charge on the imported yarns and fabrics were not made 
definitely higher than the corresponding charge imposed on the British silk producer and 
manufacturer (through the tax on his raw material). 
 The reason, of course, is that a tax on silk goods would diminish their consumption. 
If the indirect charge on the home product were exactly the same as the direct charge on 
the imported product, this percentage contraction would, other things being equal, be the 
same in the case of home production as in the case of imports, and loss and unemployment 
would be caused in the British silk industry. 
 A way out of the difficulty would be to impose such as charge on imports, in 
relation to the charge on home production, that the check on imports would be sufficiently 
great to counteract any tendency for the home industry to contract… 
 This would not be protection in the ordinary sense and it would not have the effect 
of creating any vested interests, because, if the balance of charges on imports and home 
production were so successfully adjusted as to keep the British industry of approximately 
the same size, the removal of the duty any time thereafter would leave the British industry 
unchanged. In the circumstances, it seems not unreasonable, when imposing a tax of this 
kind, to design it in such a form that the British Industry is not damaged. 
 In the case of artificial silk, the circumstances relating to the industry and foreign 
competition are different of course, but the same general argument applies (National 
Archives, CUST 143/100, pp. 249-51, emphases added). 
 
The rationale for the higher import duty reflected a sophisticated understanding of economics for 
the 1920s. An excise duty would reduce domestic consumption of rayon yarn, which was satisfied 
partly through domestic production and partly (and increasingly) through imports. A higher import 
duty would cause a greater reduction of imports, transferring a share of the British market from 
foreign producers to domestic producers. This share of the British market transferred from foreign 
to domestic producers might offset, in terms of volume, the decline in domestically supplied 
consumption wrought by the excise tax. In summary, the higher import duty was intended to shift 
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 the burden of reduced consumption entirely to foreign producers. In this context, the difference 
between the excise duty and the import duty might well be described as indemnifying protection. 
Through April 1925, the proposed duties on rayon yarn were 3s. per lb. for imports and 
2s.6d. per lb. for domestic production (National Archives, CUST 143/100, pp. 365-7). However, 
following protests by both Courtaulds and British Celanese, the duties were lowered to 2s. per lb. 
for imports and 1s. per lb. for domestic production (Times, 15 May 1925; Times, 22 May 1925). 
British Celanese expressed satisfaction with the concessions secured from the Chancellor, 
referring specifically to ‘the widening of that [protective] margin from 6d. per lb. to 1s. per lb.’ 
(Times, 22 May 1925).25 In theory, there would have been two implications of the revised duties. 
First, the reduced excise duty would have lessened the severity of the decline, ceteris paribus, in 
the domestic consumption of British rayon yarn. Second, the augmented margin of protection 
would have further reduced imports. In 1925, when the import price of rayon yarn was 5.3s. per 
lb., a margin of protection of 1s. per lb. was not inconsiderable (Trade of the United Kingdom). 
So as not to hamper the competitiveness of Britain’s rayon yarn exports, the Finance Act 
of 1925 provided for a drawback equal to the amount of the excise duty (Finance Act, 1925). If 
the excise-liable yarn was woven into cloth that was exported, then the cloth manufacturer could 
claim a drawback ‘equal to the amount payable as drawback in respect of such a quantity of silk 
or artificial silk as, in the opinion of the Commissioners, has been used in the manufacture of the 
article’ (Finance Act, 1925). The administration of the silk and rayon duties was not especially 
easy for the Customs and Excise Department. 
                                                        
 25 Although British Celanese was satisfied with the revised duties, the Lancashire cotton textile 
industry, which used rayon yarn as weft, remained vehemently opposed to the duties. On 20 July 1925, the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution opposing ‘the taxation of a raw material which was 
becoming so important to the Cotton Trade’ (National Archives, CUST 118/169, p. 56). 
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 Courtaulds and British Celanese responded to the imposition of the excise duty on rayon 
yarn by reducing their prices commensurately, in order to maintain a constant final selling price 
(Silverman, 1946, p. 330). Figure 2 depicts the domestic price inclusive of the excise duty, as well 
as the import price both exclusive and inclusive of the import duty. The absorption of the excise 
duty by Britain’s rayon-spinning firms led to a greater shift in the relative price of domestic and 
imported rayon yarn than would have occurred otherwise. This article now considers the effect of 
changing relative prices on the British market for rayon yarn. 
 
Figure 2. Domestic and import prices of rayon yarn, 1920-30 (Sources: Domestic price: Harrop (1979, 
p. 285); Import price: calculated from Trade of the United Kingdom.) 
 
 
The tariff dependence of the British rayon market 
There was considerable debate over whether the rayon duties were protective. Yet, even those like 
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 element of protection: ‘It is true that possibly they have a flavour of Protection about them, but 
they are mainly revenue-producing’ (United Kingdom House of Commons, 10 June 1925). 
Ultimately, the Finance Act of 1925 offered the British rayon industry more than just a mere flavor 
of protection. The Act, which imposed a duty of 2s. per lb. on rayon yarn imports from 1 July 1925 
onward, was instrumental in conferring upon domestic producers a substantially increased share 
of a growing domestic market. 
 In order to determine the extent to which the British rayon industry’s domestic market share 
depended upon the Finance Act of 1925, this article considers counterfactual scenarios in which 
the excise and import duties on rayon yarn were removed in 1926, prior to Courtaulds’ acquisition 
(with VGF) of its main foreign competitor in the British market, Snia Viscosa. In doing so, this 
article makes the standard Armington assumption that commodities are differentiated by country 
of origin and that these country-varieties are imperfect substitutes for each other (Armington, 
1969). This assumption is consistent with the literature on the interwar rayon industry that has 
identified cross-country variation in rayon yarn. As Cerretano (2018, p. 546) observed, Italian 
rayon yarn was of poor quality ‘with irregular size, dying properties, and tensile strength’.26  
 In a two-variety (domestic and imported) Armington framework, the ratio of Britain’s 
consumption of imported rayon yarn (M) to its consumption of domestic rayon yarn (D) is related 
to the relative price of domestic rayon yarn (pD) and imported rayon yarn (pM) according to the 
following conventional equation: 
 𝑙𝑛 #$
%
& = 𝐶 + 𝜎𝑙𝑛 #+,
+-
&       (1) 
                                                        
 26 However, the average bilateral import prices of rayon yarn from other countries were even lower 
than average import price of Italian rayon yarn, suggesting that Italian rayon yarn was not so inferior. In 
1924, the last year before the imposition of the import duty, the average bilateral import prices were as 
follows: 6.8s. per lb. for Italy; 5.8s. per lb. for the Netherlands; 6.2s. per lb. for Switzerland (calculated 
from Trade of the United Kingdom). 
  19 
 
 In this equation, C is a constant, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between the imported and 
domestic varieties of rayon yarn—the ‘Armington elasticity’. In the Armington framework, any 
policy intervention, such as the counterfactual removal of the rayon duties, that alters the relative 
price of the domestic and imported varieties (pD/pM) would alter the ratio of Britain’s consumption 
of imported rayon yarn to its consumption of domestic rayon yarn (M/D). If equation 1 is taken to 
represent the actual market for rayon yarn in 1926, the counterfactual market for rayon yarn can 
be expressed as follows, with * denoting counterfactual consumption and prices: 
  𝑙𝑛 #$
∗
%∗
& = 𝐶 + 𝜎𝑙𝑛 #+,
∗
+-
∗ &       (2) 
Subtracting equation 2 from equation 1 yields: 
  ln #$
%





& − 𝜎𝑙𝑛 #+,
∗
+-
∗ &     (3) 
Equation 3 can be rearranged as: 





& + 𝜎(𝑙𝑛𝑃$ + 𝑙𝑛𝑃%∗ − 𝑙𝑛𝑃% − 𝑙𝑛𝑃$∗ )   (4) 
 In order to estimate the effect of the removal of the duties on the ratio of Britain’s 
consumption of imported to domestic rayon yarn, it is necessary to assume an historical Armington 
elasticity (σ) for rayon yarn. In this regard, the literature in economic history offers a precedent, if 
not guidance. In their computational general equilibrium (CGE) models of the British Industrial 
Revolution, Crafts and Harley (2000, p. 829) and later Clark et al. (2014, p. 112) assumed that the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties of cotton textiles was 5.0. 
Further (non-historical) evidence of an appropriate Armington elasticity for rayon yarn comes 
from Donnelly et al. (2004, p. 44), who estimated an elasticity for ‘yarn and thread mills’ of 2.5, 
using contemporary data for the United States. However, the appropriate Armington elasticity for, 
specifically, rayon yarn is likely to be greater than 2.5, due to the existence of a heterogeneity bias 
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 in trade elasticities, whereby the elasticity tends to increase as the commodity is defined at a more 
disaggregated level (Imbs and Mejean, 2015). Still, σ = 2.5 might be taken as a conservative 
Armington elasticity that would yield a lower-bound estimate of the share of imports in domestic 
consumption following the counterfactual removal of the rayon duties.27 For an upper-bound 
estimate, it is assumed that σ = 5.0.  
 The data used in equation 4 are as follows. PD is the price of 150-denier rayon yarn, a 
standard grade, as obtained from Harrop (1979, p. 285), and is inclusive of the excise duty (1s. per 
lb.).28 PM is average price of imported rayon yarn, which is calculated from the Annual Statement 
of the Trade of the United Kingdom, and is inclusive of the import duty (2s. per lb.).29 M is the 
quantity consumed of imported rayon yarn, as reported in the latter source. D is the quantity 
consumed of domestically produced rayon yarn. This value is calculated as the difference between 
the volume of domestic production, obtained from Harrop (1968, p. 82), and the volume of exports, 
obtained from the Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom. 
 Table 3 presents the shares of imports in domestic consumption under various 
counterfactual scenarios in which the excise and import duties were removed in 1926, when the 
actual share of imports in domestic consumption was 10 percent. In Scenario 1, the baseline 
counterfactual scenario, PD* equals PD. Just as the British rayon-spinning firms absorbed the excise 
duty when it was imposed, so too could the firms raise (pre-excise) prices following the removal 
                                                        
 27 An historical Armington elasticity, albeit for pig iron, was actually estimated econometrically by 
Irwin (2000, p. 287) for the United States in the late nineteenth century. He estimated the elasticity to have 
been 2.6. If rayon yarn and pig iron are taken to be similarly homogenous commodities, then the limited 
historical evidence would not undermine the assumption of σ ≥ 2.5 for rayon yarn.   
 28 Silverman (1946, p. 308, fn. 1) described 150-denier as ‘normal viscose yarn’. For a discussion 
of the range of British rayon yarn production according to denier, see this source. Here, it may briefly be 
noted that a higher-number denier corresponds to a coarser yarn.  
 29 To calculate PM, it is necessary to add the import duty to the average import price calculated from 
the Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom. 
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 of the excise. In this scenario, PM* is 2s. less than PM, consistent with the removal of the import 
duty. Under Scenario 1, the share of imports in Britain’s consumption of rayon yarn ranges from 
24-47 percent, depending upon the assumed value of  σ. In Scenario 2, in which the British rayon-
spinning firms do not raise (pre-excise) prices following the removal of the excise, the 
counterfactual share of imports in domestic consumption is lower than in Scenario 1 but still 
substantially higher than 10 percent. 
Table 3. 
Share of imports in Britain’s consumption of rayon yarn under counterfactual scenarios, 1926 
 σ = 2.5 σ = 5.0 
Actual 0.10 0.10 
Scenario 1: PD* = PD; PM* = PM – 2 schillings 0.24 0.47 
Scenario 2: PD* = PD – 1 schilling; PM* = PM – 2 schillings 0.17 0.28 
Scenario 3: PD* = PD; PM* = 1.11(PM – 2 schillings) 0.20 0.34 
Scenario 4: PD* = PD; PM* = 1.11(PM – 2 schillings) + 2 schillings 0.09 0.08 
This table presents the share of imports in Britain’s consumption of rayon yarn (M/(M+D)), which should 
not be confused with the ratio of Britain’s consumption of imported to domestic rayon yarn (M/D). 
 
 When, in 1927, Courtaulds and VGF jointly acquired a controlling stake in Snia Viscosa, 
the British rayon market had already been sheltered against imports to a great extent, as the 
counterfactual scenarios for 1926 reveal. Trade policy, rather than market division, reversed the 
foreign incursion into Courtaulds’ domestic market. However, it was a market that Courtaulds 
would have to share with new domestic firms, in addition to its perennial rival, British Celanese. 
As Silverman (1946, p. 330) has suggested, the margin of protection contributed to a spate of new 
rayon-spinning firms in the late 1920s. None of these firms operated on any great scale, and a good 
portion of the firms existed only on paper. A typical firm would have been Harbens of Golborne, 
which commenced production in 1926 (Avram, 1929, p. 73). By 1928, it was producing 1.1 million 
lbs., while Courtaulds was producing 26.5 million lbs. (Avram, 1929, pp. 70 and 73). The scholarly 
consensus is that most of the firms formed in the late 1920s were undercapitalized and did not 
reach the minimum efficient scale of production for the industry (Jones, 1941, p. 86; Harrop, 1968, 
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 p. 73). Unsurprisingly, therefore, most of the firms did not survive the depression of the early 
1930s.30 Nevertheless, the emergence of these firms in the late 1920s confirms the existence of 
competition within the British market. Courtaulds still maintained a dominant position, to be sure, 
but the presence of new competitors served to prevent Courtaulds from setting too high of a price. 
Altogether, it may be asserted that the Finance Act of 1925 shifted the theater of competition from 
the international market to the domestic market. 
 In 1924, the last year before the imposition of the rayon duties, the share of imports in 
domestic consumption of rayon yarn peaked at 36 percent (calculated from Harrop, 1968, p. 82; 
Trade of the United Kingdom). This statistic underscores the disadvantaged position of the rayon 
industry in Britain vis-à-vis the industry in other countries, particularly Italy. What were the 
economic causes for the relative weakness of the British rayon industry? Certainly, the rayon 
industry in Britain was disadvantaged by higher wages. Moreover, it has been alleged that the 
domestic rayon industry suffered from the overvaluation of sterling in the 1920s (Harrop, 1968, p. 
78).  
 In the early 1920s, the Bank of England conducted monetary policy with the aim of 
returning to the gold standard at the pre-war parity of £1 = $4.86, per the recommendation of the 
Cunliffe Committee of 1918. However, since sterling was trading at less than this parity in the 
foreign exchange market, the Bank of England had to pursue a deflationary monetary policy in 
order to effect a return at the pre-war parity.31 Having appreciated sterling sufficiently, Britain 
                                                        
 30 For the numbers of rayon plant closures during the years of the depression, see Coleman (1969, 
p. 334). 
 31 For a general discussion of Britain’s monetary policy during this period, see Moggridge (1972, 
pp. 37-97). 
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 officially returned to the gold standard in April 1925, coincidentally just a couple of months before 
the imposition of the silk and rayon duties.32 
 Both the imposition of the rayon duties and the return to the gold standard in 1925 were 
‘consequences’ of Churchill, but it was the latter policy that incurred the criticism of Keynes. In 
The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill, Keynes (1925) argued that, in 1925, the pre-war 
parity overvalued sterling by 10 percent. Economic historians have tended to confirm that sterling 
was overvalued to at least some extent.33 The overvaluation of the currency was injurious to the 
competitiveness of Britain’s exports, but it was also conducive to the competitiveness of its 
imports, which included rayon yarn. 
 The Finance Act of 1925 reduced the share of imports in domestic consumption, and a 
devaluation of sterling would have exerted the same directional effect.34 What would have been 
the share of imports in domestic consumption if sterling had been devalued by 10 percent in 1926 
(or if Britain had returned to the gold standard at 10 percent beneath the pre-war parity)? This 
article considers two more counterfactual scenarios informed by the economic discourse of the 
1920s. Scenario 3 is the same as Scenario 1, except that in Scenario 3 sterling is devalued by 10 
percent, resulting in the price of rayon yarn imports increasing by 11 percent. In this counterfactual 
scenario, the share of  imports ranges from 20-34 percent (Scenario 3), compared to 24-47 percent 
(Scenario 1). Thus, had Britain not imposed the rayon duties but instead pursued a 10-percent 
devaluation, the share of imports in domestic consumption of rayon yarn would not have been 
                                                        
 32 The election of the Conservative Party in October 1924 explains the coincidence of these events, 
as the Conservative Party espoused both monetary and fiscal orthodoxy, i.e. a return to the gold standard 
and a balanced budget. 
 33 See Moggridge (1972, p. 105); Dimsdale (1981, p. 343); Redmond (1984, p. 528). 
 34 In the interwar era, there was a substitutability between trade policy and monetary policy among 
countries; countries that persisted in their adherence to the gold standard tended to resort more greatly to 
tariff increases (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). In the rayon industry of the 1920s, it can be conceptualized 
that, at a microeconomic level, protection was substituting for the lack of a devaluation. 
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 much reduced. In other words, with respect to the British rayon yarn market, the Finance Act of 
1925 was more consequential than would have been a devaluation of 10 percent. Scenario 4 
involves the maintenance of  the (protective) Finance Act of 1925 and a devaluation of 10 percent; 
thus, the only counterfactual element of this scenario is the devaluation. In this scenario, the share 
of imports ranges from 8-9 percent, slightly less than the actual share of imports in Britain’s 
consumption of rayon yarn in 1926.  
 Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 make the simplifying assumption that a sterling devaluation 
affects PM* but not PD*. In the long term, a sterling devaluation would raise factor input prices and 
consequently tend to raise PD*. For example, a sterling devaluation would have the effect of raising 
the price of imported wood pulp, the main material input in the production of rayon.35 Thus, a 
devaluation would have shifted the relative price of domestic and imported rayon yarn less than 
was assumed in the counterfactual scenarios. The import shares reported for Scenario 3 and 
Scenario 4 should therefore be regarded as an upper-bound estimate of the effect, via shifting 
relative prices, of a 10-percent devaluation—in line with Keynes’s stance. Even still, such a 
devaluation would not have been as potent as was the Finance Act of 1925.   
 
Conclusion 
The margin of protection extended to rayon yarn by the Finance Act of 1925 was intended only to 
indemnify the British rayon industry for a decline in domestic consumption resulting from the 
imposition of an excise duty. The effect of the margin of protection on the British market for rayon 
yarn was considerable. Had the rayon duties been removed in 1926, then the share of imports in 
Britain’s consumption of rayon yarn would have increased from one-tenth to one-quarter or more, 
                                                        
 35  Britain imported, mainly from Scandinavia and Canada, nearly all of the wood pulp used in its 
production of rayon (Silverman, 1946, p. 316). 
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 depending upon the assumed Armington elasticity. The margin of protection afforded by the 
Finance Act of 1925 transferred a greater share of the rayon market to domestic firms than would 
have been achieved through a 10-percent devaluation of sterling, as was then advocated by Keynes. 
 In the chronology of the interwar British rayon industry, the rayon duties preceded 
Courtaulds’ acquisition of Snia Viscosa in 1927. The margin of protection enabled the British 
rayon industry to reclaim almost all of the domestic market share lost in the early 1920s, before 
Courtaulds’ and VGF’s acquisition of Snia Viscosa might have afforded a partial mechanism for 
limiting rayon yarn imports. While cartels and foreign direct investment proliferated in the 
international rayon industry during the interwar era, the Finance Act of 1925 was an equally 
seminal contribution to the development of the British rayon industry. 
 Although focused on the British rayon industry, this article offers a broader insight relating 
to British history. It serves to underscore the extent of government intervention in the 
manufacturing sector of 1920s Britain. This intervention distorted the free-trade industrial 
composition of the British economy. Foreman-Peck (1979) has already documented the substantial 
degree to which the British motorcar industry depended upon the McKenna duties. This article has 
argued that the British rayon industry, threatened by rising imports, was protected by the Finance 
Act of 1925. While historians of the interwar British economy have largely focused on the 
government interventions of the 1930s, notably the Import Duties Act of 1932, this article beckons 
for a reconsideration of the 1920s as the decade during which government economic intervention 




  26 
 
 Acknowledgements 
I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Pasold Research Fund for a project titled ‘The Finance 
Act of 1925 and the origins of the artificial silk duties’. I thank Andy Seltzer and two anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments. I am also thankful for comments received at the session on 
‘The Anglosphere in the 1920s’ at the World Economic History Congress at MIT, the Frontier 
Research in Economic and Social History Conference at the University of Groningen, and the 4th 
LSE Interwar Economic History Workshop. All errors are mine. 
 
References 
Armington, P. S. (1969). A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of production. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 16(1), 159-178. 
Ashley, P. (1920). Modern tariff history: Germany, United States, France. 3rd ed. London: John 
Murray. 
Avram, M. H. (1929). The rayon industry. 2nd ed. New York: Van Nostrand. 
Bils, M. (1984). Tariff protection and production in the early U.S. cotton textile industry. Journal 
of Economic History, 44(4), 1033-1045. 
Broadberry, S. & Crafts, N. (2011). Openness, protectionism and Britain’s productivity 
performance over the long run. In G. Wood, T. C. Mills & N. Crafts (Eds.) Monetary and 
banking history: essays in honour of Forrest Capie. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 254-
286. 
Broadberry, S. & Gupta, B. (2009). Lancashire, India, and shifting competitive advantage in cotton 
textiles, 1700-1850: the neglected role of factor prices. Economic History Review, 62(2), 
279-305. 
  27 
 
 Cerretano, V. (2004). The ‘benefits of moderate inflation’: the rayon industry and Snia Viscosa in 
the Italy of the 1920s. Journal of European Economic History, 33(2), 233-84. 
Cerretano, V. (2009). The Treasury, Britain’s postwar reconstruction, and the industrial 
intervention of the Bank of England, 1921-9. Economic History Review, 62(S1), 80-100. 
Cerretano, V. (2012). European cartels, European multinationals and economic de-globalisation: 
insights from the rayon industry, c.1900-1939. Business History, 54(4), 594-622. 
Cerretano, V. (2018). Multinational business and host countries in times of crisis: Courtaulds, 
Glanzstoff, and Italy in the interwar period. Economic History Review, 71(2), 540-566. 
Clark, G., O’Rourke, K. H. & Taylor, A. M. (2014). The growing dependent of Britain on trade 
during the British industrial revolution. Scandinavian Economic History Review, 62(2), 
109-136. 
Coleman, D. C. (1969). Courtaulds: an economic and social history. Vol. 2. Rayon. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Dimsdale, N. H. (1981). British monetary policy and the exchange rate, 1920-1938. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 33(Supplement), 306-349. 
Donnelly, W. A., Ingersoll, D., Johnson, K. & Tsigas, M. (2004). Revised Armington elasticities 
of substitution for the USITC model and the concordance for constructing a consistent set 
for the GTAP model. US International Trade Commission. Office of Economics Working 
Paper No. 2004-01-A. 
Dunham, A. L. (1928). The development of the cotton industry in France and the Anglo-French 
Treaty of Commerce of 1860. Economic History Review, 1(2), 281-307. 
Economist. London. 
  28 
 
 Eichengreen, B. & Irwin, D. A. (2010). The slide to protectionism in the Great Depression: who 
succumbed and why? Journal of Economic History, 70(4), 871-897. 
Federico, G. (1997). An economic history of the silk industry, 1830-1930. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Foreman-Peck, J. S. (1979). Tariff protection and economies of scale: the British motor industry 
before 1939. Oxford Economic Papers, 31(2), 237-257. 
Harley, C. K. (1992). International competitiveness of the antebellum American cotton textile 
industry. Journal of Economic History, 52(3), 559-584. 
Harley, C. K. (2001). The antebellum tariff: different products or competing sources? A comment 
on Irwin and Temin. Journal of Economic History, 61(3), 799-805. 
Harley, C. K. & Crafts, N. F. R. (2000). Simulating the two views of the British industrial 
revolution. Journal of Economic History, 60(3), 819-841.  
Harrop, J. (1968). The growth of the rayon industry in the inter war years. Yorkshire Bulletin of 
Economic and Social Research, 20(2), 71-84. 
Harrop, J. (1979). Rayon. In N. K. Buxton & D. H. Aldcroft (Eds.) British industry between the 
wars: instability and industrial development, 1919-1939. London: Scolar Press. pp. 276-
302. 
Hicks, U. K. (1938). The finance of British government, 1920-1936. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hoffman, W. G. (1955). British industry, 1700-1950. W. H. Chaloner & W. O. Henderson (Trans.) 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Hoffman, W. G. (1958). The growth of industrial economies. W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner 
(Trans.) Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
  29 
 
 Imlah, A. H. (1958). Economic elements in the Pax Britannica: studies in British foreign trade in 
the nineteenth century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Irwin, D. A. (2000). Could the United States iron industry have survived free trade after the Civil 
War? Explorations in Economic History, 37, 278-299. 
Irwin, D. A. & Temin, P. (2001). The antebellum tariff on cotton textiles revisited. Journal of 
Economic History, 61(3), 777-98. 
Jones, E. (1941). Price leadership in the rayon industry. Manchester School, 12(1), 80-96. 
Keynes, J. M. (1925). The economic consequences of Mr. Churchill. London: Hogarth Press. 
McGuire, E. B. (1938). The British tariff system. London: Methuen. 
Moggridge, D. E. (1972). British monetary policy, 1924-1931: the Norman conquest of $4.86. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
National Archives. CUST 118/169. Artificial silk: cellulose acetate; miscellaneous (1925). 
National Archives. CUST 143/100. Silk duty vol.1: report on silk industry (1923-5). 
Redmond, J. (1984). The sterling overvaluation in 1925: a multilateral approach. Economic 
History Review, 37(4), 520-532. 
Russell, R. S. (1947). Imperial preference: its development and effects. London: Empire Economic 
Union. 
Silverman, H. A. (1946). The artificial textile industry. In H. A. Silverman (Ed.) Studies in 
Industrial Organization. London: Methuen. pp. 302-55. 
Times. (15 May 1925). Proposed excise duty on artificial silk: Courtaulds, Limited, have issued 
the following statement. London. 
Times.  (22 May 1925). Artificial silk duties: statement of British Celanese Ltd. London. 
  30 
 
 Tyszynski, H. (1951). World trade in manufactured commodities, 1899-1950. Manchester School, 
19(3), 272-304. 
United Kingdom, Board of Trade. (various issues). Annual Statement of the Trade of the United 
Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions. London: HMSO. 
United Kingdom Board of Trade. (1933). Final Report on the Fourth Census of Production, 1930: 
Part 1: The Textile Trades, the Leather Trades; The Clothing Trades. London: HMSO. 
United Kingdom. (1925). Finance Act, 1925. 15 & 16 Geo. 5., Ch. 36. 
United Kingdom House of Commons Sessional Papers. (1925). 5th series, vol. 184. 
Varian, B. D. (2019). The growth of manufacturing protection in 1920s Britain. Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy, 66(5), 703-11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
